On Emotion and Value in David Hume and Max Scheler Essay -- David Hume

On perception and Value in David Hume and Max SchelerABSTRACT While some philosophers tilt to exclude any significance of sense for the moral life, others place them in the center of both the moral life and the theory of evaluate judgment. This publisher presents a confrontation of two classic presents of the second type, namely the position of Hume and Scheler. The ultimate goal of this confrontation is metatheoretical particularly as it concerns the analysis of the relations among the opinion of emotion and the idea of value in this agreeable of theory of value judgment. In conclusion, I point to some of the essence(predicate) theoretical assumptions which underlie the positions of both thinkers despite all the other differences between them. In at least four types of ethical theories emotions and feelings are regarded as a vital factor in explaining the nature of both value judgement and value itself. Such types of ethical theories, however, offer not altogether differ ent theories of value and valuation but they also assume or imply quite different theories of emotions and feelings. A look at the business relationship of philosophical psychology can convince us that there has been no generally accepted theory of emotion but the idea of emotion has been changing together with the idea of mind or soul. (1) One could calculate that there is a correlation between the idea of emotion and the idea of value or the good in each type of the preceding(prenominal) mentioned theories. In what follows, I shall discuss this correlation for two ethical theories in greater detail. I shall consider the moral philosophy of David Hume which I run into as psychological naturalism of non-relativistic type. (2) I shall also consider the grimace of emotional intuitionism exemplified by Max Scheler. Both H... ...the objects of emotion see Sousa, de R. - The reason of Emotion, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1990.(9) For excellent discussion of this point see Hudson, S. D. - Humean Pleasure Reconsidered, Canadian daybook of Philosophy 5 (1975), no 4, pp. 545-62 Fieser, J. - Humes Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors, Hume Studies 18 (1992), no 1, pp. 1-17.(10) discipline note 8 above.(11) Scheler, Max - Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 2, Francke Verlag, Bern - Mnchen 1954, pp. 256-278 hereafter cited as F.(12) F, pp. 341-356. See also Smith, Q. - Schelers Stratification of Emotional support and Strawsons Person, Philosophical Studies (Irleand), 25 (1977), pp. 103-127. (13) F, pp. 125 -130.(14) Cf. Calhoun, Ch., Solomon, R. C. - What is an Emotion, Oxford University Press, New York 1984.